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The design of intergovernmental transfers is an important issue
in federal countries not only because the sub-national governments often
depend on these to maintain their supply of public services, but also
because the various elements of the determination of transfers may have
incentive effects for the sub-national governments. These may not be
taken into account fully while designing the transfers and may thus have
unintended effects.
The reasons for intergovernmental grants are similar across
nations, although the actual applicability of and emphasis on each of
these reasons may vary with the way public finances are organized in
particular cases.
1 As several reviews of intergovernmental transfers point
out, there are six basic reasons: ameliorating vertical imbalance,
reducing horizontal imbalance, correcting for inter-jurisdictional
spillovers, ensuring minimum standards of basic services, paying for
agency functions undertaken by sub-national governments and returning
revenues to lower level governments as a part of a tax-rental
arrangement. Clearly, an evaluation of a transfer system – or an element
thereof – requires an understanding of the objective(s) involved and an
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assessment of the extent to which the objective is met. Additionally,
there are some desirable features that the transfer system should have,
mainly arising from efficiency considerations, but also to ensure that the
system meets the relevant objectives in practice. These include
adequacy, regularity, transparency and feasibility; it is possible to add to
these.
2 An overarching consideration is that of the incentives built into the
system: the safest system from this point of view would be one that
based transfers on variables completely outside the control of the
recipient governments.
In this paper, we examine the transfer system that operates in
India through the institution of the Finance Commission (which implies
that plan transfers and discretionary transfers are excluded from its
scope). The focus is on an evaluation of the need, appropriateness and
manner of use of various socio-economic criteria in the design of
transfers mandated by the Finance Commissions over the years, placing
them in the context of international experience.
II. Why Use Indicators At All?
To start a discussion of the indicators used in the Indian
intergovernmental transfer schemes, one must begin with the need for
formula-based transfers that necessitate the use of the indicators. After
all, not every nation with multi-tier governmental structure uses them.
One alternative that we are inclined to dismiss summarily is a system
comprising solely of discretionary or bargain-based transfers. While such
transfers do exist in some countries including India, they are never the
only type of transfer, nor are they ‘good’, in that they severely affect the
autonomy of the states, are uncertain and can be completely inequitable.
A more serious alternative, and actually an appropriate one in our view,
would be a system based completely on normative assessments of
revenue and expenditures, with transfers filling up the normative deficits.
In case transferable resources fall short of the total of the normative
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deficits, a proportional adjustment can easily be made. This, in essence,
is the system used in Australia.
The reasons for our preference for such a system, of course, is
that it combines equity considerations with those of efficiency in the best
possible manner. The critics of the gap -filling approach used in India
earlier have discussed this issue at great length, which need not be
repeated. In fact, probably in response to these criticisms, the terms of
reference for the Ninth Finance Commission explicitly advocated a
normative approach for the distribution of deficit grants. An attempt was
duly made to use this approach, but in the end, the bottom lines were not
really affected very much by the approach because (a) formula-based
tax devolution as a first step took a large number of states out of the
ambit of deficit grants, (b) the normative estimates were diluted
ostensibly to make the transition easier and (c) substantial grants for
‘special purposes’ ruined any objectivity that the system might have had.
It also clearly lacked transparency, as the critical chorus of state
government officials about not understanding the system, during the
working of the Commission and immediately after the report was
submitted, showed.
3 Arguably, the understanding of the normative
approach has improved since then.
It should be noted here that the use of normative approach does
not rule out the use of indicators altogether, but only the direct use in
computing amounts of transfers. For example, normative assessment of,
say, health expenditures in various states can be done on the basis of an
econometric exercise using a number of health status indicators and
indicators of ‘cost disabilities’. But this example also serves to illustrate
why complete reliance on the normative approach has not found
widespread favour in India. The data requirements for such an approach
is large, as respectable normative assessments can only be done in a
disaggregated framework. It also requires quite a bit of work, which in
turn requires more time for the Finance Commission to complete its job
than they normally have; in fact, a permanent institution like the
Commonwealth Grants Commission is the logical complement of a
system based completely on normative assessments.
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How does one rationalise a transfer system based on indicators
then? For us, distribution formulae using such indicators would be only
an approximation of a full-blown normative assessment, perhaps with a
greater degree of transparency. To put it in another way, a formula
based on socio-economic indicators may be interpreted as the reduced
form of a set of structural equations. If normative expenditure in state i
(Ei
*) is a function of a set of variables Xij just as revenue capacity (Ri
*) is
a function of a similar set of variables Yim, and the two sets of variables
Xij and Yim are determined by a single set of exogenous variables Zik (the
second subscript is different to indicate that the number of determinants
need not be the same as for either expenditures or revenue), then it can
be seen that the difference between normative revenues and
expenditures can be expressed as a function of Zik. This third set of
exogenous variables may or may not contain variables from Xij and Yim.
Then, transfers based on normative deficits should be linked to Zik in the
reduced form. When k is small and the variables are easy to understand,
a formula driven transfer system will be both efficient and transparent.
III. Taking into Account Vertical and
Horizontal Imbalance
The first issue relating to imbalances that needs reflection is that
of considering the objectives of vertical and horizontal balance
separately. It is possible to argue that in the context of individual states,
both are reflected in a single indicator, the normative deficit. In such a
case, if the distribution formula is implicitly based on normative deficit,
then why should one bother to consider them separately? In fact, transfer
systems such as the Australian one do not, and are probably correct in
doing so. But as we shall see below, this is not necessarily true of all
formula-driven transfer that may be implicitly based on normative deficits.
A formula-driven system of transfers, even when implicitly based
on normative deficits, does not necessarily cover the entire normative
deficit and may even overcompensate. This is simply because normative
deficits are not known in such a system; precisely because they are not9
known that an approximating formula is required. It follows that if a
relatively better-off state, which may only have a small imbalance, is
overcompensated, it would mean that that state is getting more than
what it should get to cover its share of vertical imbalance while it should
not be entitled to any transfer based on horizontal imbalance at all. There
would then necessarily be some other state that would get less than its
due unless the total distributable kitty is larger than what it ought to be. In
the latter case, the system would be inefficient, as it would use up more
funds than strictly required, and would be particularly inappropriate when
the grantor government is itself in deficit. The seriousness of this
problem varies with the way the formula is applied. The system can
conceptually provide for both positive and negative grants for individual
states. Germany is one example of such a system, but it is in fact rare. In
such a system, the problem of overcompensation would not exist, and
the negative transfers would be fully attributable to equalisation, i.e.,
promoting horizontal equity. Another system would be of positive
transfers up to a point (the norm), and states above that level receive
zero transfer. The Canadian system, and the Indian system of deficit
grants would be examples of this. Even here, the overcompensation
problem is not present unless there are other elements of the transfer
system that cause the outcome to be different (as in India).  The problem
would however, be serious if all states necessarily received positive
amounts, as in the case of tax sharing in India, quantitatively far more
significant than deficit grants.
Vertical imbalance is by definition a concept that is applicable to
a particular level of sub-national units as a whole, and allocating the
overall imbalance among individual units is not conceptually easy. When
the transfer system has to be designed on the basis of available
information on budgetary outcomes that mix up vertical and horizontal
imbalance (and possibly some amount of fiscal sloth and/or inefficiency),
perhaps the best way of conceptually separating them out is to think of
vertical imbalance as a fixed amount equal to the normative deficit of the
state with the  smallest  such  deficit, for   each of the sub-national  units
(Bird and Smart, 2002).
4 After taking care of the vertical imbalance in this
fashion,
5 the remaining deficits can then be ascribed to horizontal
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If normative deficits are not being assessed and covered, then it
is equalisation where the role of a formula and indicators becomes
important. This is actually the case in several federal systems, where the
explicit objective of using a formula is equalisation (e.g., Canada,
Germany, U.K., Nigeria and South Africa). India is an odd case where
normative assessments are made and used for one type of transfers, but
without any explicit articulation of the objective (except in recent reports
of FCs), an equalisation type formula is being used for another (fiscally
more significant) type of transfer as well. It must be pointed out that the
appropriateness of a formula or the constituent criteria thereof depends
heavily on the type of transfer instrument and the objectives sought to be
achieved.
IV. Evolution of the Indian Transfer System
The ambivalence characterizing the Indian system is noticeable
from the way the relevant constitutional provisions and the distribution
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devolution deficits/surpluses.11
formula have evolved over the years. We briefly summarize this process
in this section
7 and then proceed to a discussion of the various criteria in
the next.
The statutory transfers in India consisted of three different parts
to begin with, income tax sharing, excise duty sharing and the grants-in-
aid. While the grants are clearly meant for enhancement of fiscal
capacity, the constitution does not spell out the objective(s) of tax
sharing. The three-way transfer system follows faithfully the relevant
constitutional provisions, and different (sets of) criteria were used to
distribute transfers through these three channels. Until the Eight Finance
Commission (hereafter FC) brought in other criteria, the sharing of
income tax was only on the basis of the neutral criterion of population,
with a much smaller weight given to derivation.
8  The first and second
FCs distributed the share of Union excise duties simply on the basis of
population, but the latter kept aside 10 percent for discretionary
allocation. The third FC added financial weakness and economic
backwardness to the major factor of population introducing an element of
equalisation into tax sharing, but the weights were not specified. The
Fourth used the same factors with 80 percent and 20percent weights
respectively. The fifth, sixth, and seventh FCs further added per capita
income as a distribution criterion for excise duties, the sixth FC dropping
the backwardness factor. The seventh FC used an explicit revenue
equalisation criterion in the distribution of excise duties.
There were a number of breaks from tradition in the
recommendations of the eighth FC. For the first time, an element of
equalisation was brought into the distribution of income tax too with the
use of per capita income in two different forms (discussed in some detail
in the next section). Also for the first time, a part of the shareable excise
duties was set aside exclusively for the deficit states, a feature continued
until the eleventh FC. The general distribution formula contained the
population criterion along with two forms of the income criterion. The
Ninth FC, in its two reports, added the criteria of poverty and index of
backwardness alternately to the variables included by the eighth in the
distribution of the states’ share of income tax, and the Union excise duty.
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The awards of the Tenth FC again were characterised by
departures from the trend. It completely dropped the derivation criterion
for the first time. It also used the same distribution formula for the states’
shares of both income tax and excise duty, a step recommended by
researchers for some time, but not very popular in certain quarters
because of the marked emphasis on equalisation. The formula included
the criteria of area, index of infrastructure and tax effort for the first time,
besides the more orthodox criteria of population and (some variant of)
per capita income. Finally, it recommended an alternative scheme of tax
sharing with a fixed share of all Union tax revenues to be set aside for
distribution to states on the basis of a single formula. This
recommendation was accepted with some modifications in the definition
of the distributable pool, and necessary constitutional amendment was
carried out. The Eleventh FC gave its recommendations under the new
system, essentially continuing with the same criteria as used by the
tenth, with one minor change. Fiscal discipline was substituted for tax
effort.
Grants-in-aid have been distributed on the basis of projected
deficits remaining after the tax devolution. As the successive FCs
widened the coverage of tax sharing, the relative size of shared taxes
rose in comparison to grants, until grants became almost insignificant in
the awards of the Tenth FC. The Eleventh FC reversed this to some
extent, but the overall trend towards greater reliance on tax devolution
compared to grants, along with progressively stronger emphasis on
equalisation in the devolution of taxes is unmistakable.
V. Criteria for Distribution13
For an assessment of various criteria that have been in use by
the successive FCs in India, and similar criteria used elsewhere, perhaps
the best way is to group similar ones commonly in use and other criteria
by the objectives sought to be achieved. This has the advantage of
facilitating a discussion of pros and cons of similar criteria together and
allowing us to take a view on the best alternative. But before we start the
discussion on the various criteria, it may be appropriate, in view of the
importance of the transfers in the sub-national budgets, to lay down a
few features that should ideally characterize the information base used.
Following Boex (2002) and Ahmad  et. al. (1999), the data base/
variables used should:
•  Be statistically sound and compiled using common principles,
•  Be available and comparable across units of governments,
•  Be as up-to-date as possible and regularly reviewed,
•  Come from an independent source to the extent possible so that they
cannot be manipulated by the different levels of government,
•  Be different in effect from other variables, and
•  Reflect needs or demands for public goods (for example, the number
of clients), instead of physical input measures.
V.1  Equalizing Fiscal Capacity: the Income-Based Criteria
Variants of the income criterion have been in use in India since
the Fifth FC. There are other federations (e.g., Brazil and China) that use
this criterion for intergovernmental transfers, but several developing
countries lack the necessary data to make use of it. In general, this
criterion appears to be directly linked to interstate equity, and therefore
ought to be a progressive and redistributive one, ideal for equalisation.
But the limitations imposed by available data, unclear a priori standing
and ambiguities about the best form of this variable to be used have
marred its utility, despite its consistent use by the last seven FCs (and
incidentally, the Planning Commission).
Ideally, the income variable to be used, if at all, is the personal
disposable income, or the state level counterpart of the per capita
national income. Unfortunately, this is not available, and gross/net
domestic product is used instead. The problem with this is that neither
the productive capacity of the state nor the purchasing power in the
hands of the residents is accurately reflected in the estimated figures.14
The problems relating to actual location of the productive activity (see,
Dholakia, 2003) and to large amounts of remittances are well known.
The case for including an income variable with a negative
association is usually predicated upon a positive link of income with fiscal
capacity, assuming that the system attempts equalisation of fiscal
capacity and not regional inequality per se.
9 While it is true that lower
incomes can reasonably be expected to lower revenue capacity, it is also
true that most researchers find a positive link between demand for public
goods and income as well. Then, the net increase in fiscal capacity with
rising incomes becomes uncertain, and so does the utility of income as a
criterion in a distribution formula. International experience reveals that
relatively few developing countries explicitly attempt to assess sub-
national fiscal capacity due to their lack of detailed data on revenue
bases. Direct capacity measures are more common in transfer formulas
of developed countries, as is the case in Japan, Australia or Canada. It is
therefore quite typical that - due to scarce data resources - fiscal
capacity is proxied with the help of a macro index such as the GSDP in
India. But this rough approximation is precarious, as it is doubtful
whether the GSDP properly represents a state's revenue raising
capacity. Also, GSDP data could conceivably be subject to manipulation
(the so-called ‘comparable estimates’ are after all based on state level
data with some marginal adjustments), resulting in bad
intergovernmental comparability. Given its overwhelming importance in
the allocation formula, one should certainly keep in mind the
considerable impact of even small inexactitudes in the measurement of
GSDP and its general inappropriateness to represent a state's “ability to
pay”. The inclusion of such a fiscal capacity proxy in the allocation
formula could potentially do more harm than good, particularly in
combination with large weights.
Two variants of the income criterion have been used in India, for
some time in tandem: the distance criterion and the inverse income
criterion.
10 The distance criterion reflects disparities in the states’ per
capita income and measures their absolute resource gaps, while the
inverse income criterion essentially reflects relative disparities. The
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implications of using these alternative formulations differ: middle-income
states lose out with the latter as compared to the former. Using the two
together (with the same total weight) should put the distribution between
those implied by either of them, with the relative weights determining the
exact location. There have been other adjustments made in the use of
this indicator, e.g., in the definition of the highest income. The sum total
of all this fine tuning is to introduce increasing complexity with unclear
gains in equity; at least in the interest of simplicity, a straightforward
distance formula should be used, and given the problems associated
with this criterion, a lower weight should be attached to it, even if it
implies an apparently less progressive distribution. After all, the moral
hazard relating to rewarding lower growth also needs to be taken into
account. Further, if this is taken as a proxy for fiscal capacity, then
serious consideration should be given to computing and using the same
directly.
V.2  Evening out Different Levels of Expenditure needs:
Population, Area, Poverty, Backwardness and
Infrastructure Indicators
V.2.1. The population criterion
The population criterion reflects the assumption that a state's
expenditure needs generally grow proportionally with the number of its
inhabitants. Although it is not a progressive criterion by itself, it has
considerable equalising impact. The criterion does not take into account
the differences of states in their fiscal capacities, but provides equal per
capita transfers to all states.
Population is an important and commonly used allocation factor
in transfer formulae around the world. In fact population-based revenue
sharing has clear advantages: it is a simple and transparent indicator,
rather objective and provides a high degree of predictability. Several
countries around the globe, like Brazil, Pakistan, Colombia, Germany,
Spain, Portugal and Italy, rely heavily on the population variable for the
distribution of general-purpose grants.
We believe that population in principle is an appropriate and
objective allocation factor, as it targets every citizen - as the ultimate
client of public services - equally. However it is elementary to ensure that16
accurate and timely data are used in the distribution formula.
Unfortunately this is not the case for the FC allocation formula in India.
“The Finance Commission is politically bound to use census data of 1971
for the calculation of the population-based shares, even though census
information on 1981, 1991 and 2001 is available. The objective in using
the 1971 population is to implicitly penalise states that do badly on the
population front. This provision is bad in law (there are no constitutional
provisions in this regard); bad in theory (states are penalised for in-
migration, for reduction in mortality rate and because they are poorer)
and bad in practice (in relative terms, the maximum loss is to the special
category states)”  (Srivastava and Sen, 2000).
Apart from these serious data flaws, one can point out that the
small weight accorded to population does not correspond to its strong
influence on expenditure needs. There seems to be no theoretically
plausible reason, why successive FCs have consistently reduced the
weight of population in the allocation formula. Given its current low
weight and due to the inappropriate usage in the FC formula, we feel that
the population variable is not used as it could be ideally and has lost
much of its initial appeal. It is true that it is implicitly used in the various
FC formulae whenever any variable is defined in per capita terms, but in
practically all such cases, its use is essentially as a normalising factor,
which is quite different from use of population per se as a variable in its
own right.
V.2.2.The area criterion
The area indicator is intended to reflect cost disadvantages to
state governments for providing basic services to its citizens. Less
densely populated areas typically require higher levels of government
services and these create higher costs (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex,
2002). A good example of such cost disabilities would be the desert
areas in Rajasthan, where small villages situated at large distances from
each other raise the per capita costs of providing basic services as well
as infrastructure. Because of this, many other countries such as
Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Brazil and Philippines have explicitly
incorporated the criterion of geographical size in their allocation formula.
But the other side of the coin, with respect to the use of area (or
population density) is that the costs of delivering public services tend to
be higher in very densely populated areas as well – the well-known17
Baumol’s cost-disease hypothesis. In fact, in Germany, city-states
receive higher allocation due to the "disadvantage" of urbanization.
Similar arrangements can be found in Korea and again Japan (Bird and
Tarasov, 2002; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2002).  On the local level, in
France even an ‘urban solidarity’ compensation was established
supporting municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants (PWC,
2000). To be sure, this consideration applies more to the cities than
states, but it could be relevant for highly urbanized states or states with a
number of congested cities too, since a part of the burden of the local
government tends to get transferred to the state government in the
Indian context of limited flexibility of local governments to meet these
special requirements.
Sometimes, other special locational characteristics are also in
the reckoning. The Swiss grant formula used to include a factor that
recognizes increased costs for cantons in mountainous areas (Dafflon,
1999) and in Nepal there have been lengthy discussions about including
a "remoteness" variable in the formula design (Boex, 2002). Similarly, in
the South African grant formula each rural person is counted as equal to
1.25 urban persons in recognition of the special problems of the rural
areas (Ahmad, 1998). Countries like Morocco or Colombia categorise
their localities even more accurately according to their size, by type and
sometimes by region. Such attempts “have sometimes proved to be
helpful guides to general expenditure needs” (Bird and Smart, 2002). To
adjust the standard unit cost of providing public services in
disadvantaged regions, Japan uses several modification coefficients
such as “cold climate” or “rapid population decrease” (Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2002). In Malawi, 13 percent of grants are distributed on per
capita basis exclusively to a number of drought-stricken regions
(Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2002). Thus there is plenty of support on
the use of geographical characteristics in general in the formula for
distributing transfers.
While introducing the area factor for the first time, the Tenth FC
itself highlights some of the weaknesses of the area indicator. Their
Report recognizes that costs do not necessarily increase proportionately
with the size of the states. There are economies of scale to be
considered also, and states with very small areas or with hilly terrain
would face higher than proportionate per capita costs. To allow for these
deficiencies and to avoid excessive variations in resource allocations
among state governments on this count, they established an upper and18
lower end to the area-based overall share of the states. The Eleventh
Finance Commission has adopted these floor and ceiling limits of 2
percent and 10 percent, whereas the weight of the indicator has been
augmented without any clear justification. In any case it should be
pointed out that indicators such as population density or territorial size
are very rough proxies of actual expenditure needs and are therefore
always somehow unsatisfactory. But they do have the advantage of
avoiding the moral hazard problem, being outside the control of the state
governments. However, it needs to be kept in mind that ultimately all the
factors considered above are indirect ways of approximating differences
in cost of public service provision; if some way can be found to do it
directly, that would obviate the need for these proxies and would clearly
be a better method.
V.2.3.Poverty and backwardness criteria
The Ninth FC used poverty as a criterion in its first report despite
recognizing the serious data and methodological problems involved, but
better sense prevailed at the time of the submission of the final report.
While removal of poverty is undoubtedly a laudable general objective, it
is hardly the right one for a transfer formula, nor is it a good indicator of
expenditure need. First, it is much better targeted through specific
purpose transfers (with or without matching requirements), as it is being
done in India. Second, at the time it was used, poverty was not even a
good indicator of either revenue capacity or cost disability: the example
of Maharashtra (that had high per capita income as also relatively high
levels of poverty) would suffice to make this point. Finally, it is an
outcome that is not outside the control of the states; public policy has a
lot to do with the incidence of poverty. In this situation, using poverty
estimates for distributing transfers could easily provide the wrong
incentives.
In comparison, the backwardness criterion used by the second
report of the Ninth FC does not suffer from these problems. It can
perhaps be improved by rationalizing and widening the variable as the
percentage of population dependent on government expenditure
(besides the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribe population, it could
include children of school-going age, senior citizens, the disabled and
other such categories), but it certainly has the advantage of not being
influenced by government policy except in the very long run.19
V.2.4.The infrastructure criterion
The introduction of the infrastructure criterion by the Tenth FC in
1995 was meant to compensate state governments with smaller
infrastructure endowments. It can be interpreted as a criterion that
reflects cost deficiencies of a state. The assumption involved is that the
greater the infrastructure deficiencies of a state are, the greater will be its
costs of providing public services (Srivastava, 2003).
However the Finance Commission's explicit reason for
incorporating the infrastructure criterion has been to promote
development and growth of “backward” states. The ultimate aim is to
improve living conditions, educational services and investment appeal of
disabled regions (Report of the Tenth Finance Commission, p. 176). This
desire is of course understandable, though in this context of
unconditional general-purpose grants it is not at all convincing. If the
centre wishes to foster the development of infrastructure in
disadvantaged and poorer regions it should rather consider conditional
specific-purpose grants, which are targeted and can be properly
regulated.
The FC infrastructure index of the states is a weighted
combination of economic and social infrastructure indices, which in turn
are composed of a number of sub-indices. The economic infrastructure
index consists of data on agriculture, banking, electricity, transport and
communication facilities. The social infrastructure indicator contains data
on educational and health service endowments, such as the number of
hospital beds or primary schools. The weight of the infrastructure
criterion has been raised to 7.5 percent by the Eleventh FC, with no clear
justification in their report.
It is generally considered a "bad" practice in grant design to
include the level of infrastructure availability as an allocation factor
(Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2002). Notwithstanding this negative
assessment, some countries other than India have used criteria based
on physical infrastructure measures. Examples would be Nigeria or
Ethiopia. Argentina in the 1970s had a transfer formula which included
an index of the “development gap” based on measures of housing
quality, the number of vehicles and the educational level (Bird and
Vaillancourt, 1998).20
Using an infrastructure index in the transfer formula fails several
tests of a ‘good’ indicator of cost disability. Its use can provide the wrong
incentives, since it is not exogenous to the system; the recipient
governments play a major role in the provision of infrastructure. Since
the states with lesser infrastructure attain higher transfers, the index
clearly provides incentives to the states not to invest in the creation and
maintenance of infrastructure, as these measures would indirectly
decrease future grant transfers. This index is based on inputs and
outcomes, whereas an index of ‘need’ would be the right one to use. The
needs of a state could be easily quantified by the number of potential
‘clients’ that should receive respective services or transfers (e.g., the
number of school-aged children and elderly people). The grant literature
widely agrees on this general rule for the assessment of sub-national
needs (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2002; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998)
and rejects input-based variables such as the FC infrastructure index.
In the Indian context, there is another aspect that needs to be
noted. While the use of infrastructure index may reward states with low
values explicitly, this is substantially undone in the computation of deficit
grants. The assessed expenditure needs usually take the existing stock
of infrastructure and allow for maintenance on such stock. This method
results in lower maintenance costs allowed for states with poor
infrastructure, cancelling out the gains through the explicit use in the
distribution formula. At the present juncture, there are further
complications with the use of this variable, due to an enhanced role of
the private sector in the provision of infrastructure. The objective of
promoting reforms may dictate unambiguous rewards for enhanced
availability of infrastructure, but the fact remains that to the extent it is
privately financed, government resources do not have to be augmented
through transfers. Overall, the various problems relating to the use of
infrastructure index suggest that it is a variable better not used in the
transfer formula; instead, a variable that more directly approaches the
issue by defining potential "clients" or the need for infrastructure should
be used to steer clear of the moral hazard problem.
V.3 Fiscal Performance Criteria: Bringing about Budgetary
Balance
The fiscal performance criteria embedded in the FC devolution
formula aim to correct possible systemic disincentives and foster fiscal21
discipline of state governments. Redistribution and voluminous
intergovernmental transfers per se are said to have discouraging effects
both on revenue raising (see, Lalvani, 2002) and expenditure restraints
of the states. While the worries about proper incentive compatibility and
sub-national fiscal prudence are surely justified, there are some serious
problems and policy concerns about the integration of various fiscal
performance criteria in a redistributive grant system. The basic criterion
has taken two different forms so far as the devolution formulae are
concerned, but other forms have been used by the FC in deciding debt
relief.
V.3.1.Tax effort criterion
The tax effort criterion introduced by the Tenth FC and continued
by the Eleventh, aims to reward the states’ revenue performance. A state
receives a higher share in the FC tax devolution the more it exploits its
presumed tax base. Due to the alleged lack of suitable data on the
diverse sub-national tax bases, the Commission uses the GSDP as a
proxy for the states’ taxable capacity. Tax effort is therewith defined as
the ratio of per capita own tax revenue of a state to its per capita GSDP.
This simple tax-GSDP ratio is then additionally weighted with the inverse
of the states' GSDP, to take into account revenue raising disabilities of
poorer states. Apart from the fact that GSDP is a very simplistic indicator
and does not take into account a large number of factors directly
influencing the tax raising capacity of a state, and that better estimates of
tax effort can certainly be made, there are  a priori reasons for not
considering tax effort a good distributive criterion.
As McLure (1997) argues: “It is difficult to justify including tax
effort in grant formulas. It runs counter to the purpose of fiscal
decentralization, which is to allow sub-national governments to decide
how much tax effort to put forth.” In fact the degree of tax exploitation
ultimately depends on the political and ideological determination of each
state government. States have different expenditure philosophies and a
state should not receive additional equalisation transfers as a reward for
levying more taxes to provide an above-average standard of public
services. This criterion may be suitable for a highly centralised system,
where sub-national governments have no autonomy with respect to
determining tax rate or base and are expected to administer the tax laws
as best as they can. India is clearly not such a federation. It is an
imperfect indicator of fiscal efficiency too, simply because it is one sided22
and does not take into account the expenditure side of the budget. In a
situation of widespread deficits, the anxiety to encourage tax effort and
reduce the deficits is understandable; but the inherent problems
associated with this criterion suggest that it should be used sparingly
only when there is reason to believe that the states in general are lacking
in tax effort. There is broad agreement on the theoretical prescription that
in the long run, federal policies should try “to neither discourage nor
encourage tax effort,” and should be neutral.
Rewarding regions that exert higher levels of fiscal effort does
not support the optimal distribution and allocation of public expenditures.
Instead it might result in the use of federal resources on inappropriate or
even wasteful local projects. To highlight the perverse outcome of the
introduction of a tax effort criterion (like the one applied by the FC)
imagine a state which has been successful in attracting investment and
new economic activities due to the efficient provision of public services
and low taxes. This state will be penalised twofold at the time of grant
allocation. Both its supposedly low tax effort and the increased GSDP
will lower the states position in the FC tax effort index resulting in lower
transfers.
There are a number of countries that attempt to include explicit
measures of fiscal effort in their distributive formulae. These include
Colombia, Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania and Spain. Critical
assessments of some of these systems generally indicate no impact on
fiscal effort, and worse, significant allocative distortions (Ahmad and
Baer, 1997; Shah, 1998; Martinez-Vazquez, 2002; Romanik et al., 1999).
In the Indian context, additional difficulties with the tax effort index relate
to its distortion through tax exportation by more developed states and
possible non-linearities in the relation between the tax base and the tax
revenue.
To sum up, it is likely that a high price is paid to motivate the
states to raise higher taxes, which may not come about in practice, and
may not even be desirable. The Eleventh  FC lowered the weight of the
tax effort criterion to 5 percent, but introduced the fiscal discipline
criterion that has its own problems.
V.3.2. Fiscal discipline criterion
Essentially driven by the rising sub-national current and fiscal
deficits, the Eleventh Finance Commission for the first time incorporated23
a “fiscal discipline” variable in the devolution formula. The FC actually
constructed an index of fiscal improvement, which compares the ratio of
a state’s own revenue receipts to its total revenue expenditure with a
“similar ratio” for all states. The idea is to reward states that have done
relatively better in terms of their revenue balance. “The better the
performance of a state in achieving revenue balance relative to others,
the higher its share in devolution”(Srivastava, 2003). It is a performance
criterion, which measures relative fiscal improvements in a reference
period compared to a specific base period. Given the serious fiscal
concerns in India, this “innovative” variable might appear appropriate on
first sight, but a careful analysis shows serious weaknesses.
First of all, defining the criterion in terms of the change over a
base year value can create a problem of rewarding past sins. It is
generally thought to be easier to improve upon ‘bad performance’ as
against ‘good’. Further, the average against which a particular state’s
performance is judged is also in terms of change. Hence, when every
state is doing badly, a state that only maintains its base year
performance – good or bad – is rewarded. Thus, the encouragement to
achieve fiscal discipline may not be strong. While these criticisms are
correct in general, the use of the criterion has to be judged in the
particular context of widespread deficits and more as a ‘fire fighting’
measure than as a standard or regular one. Also, the use of levels
instead of change is debatable in that it would perpetuate the fiscal
advantages of the better-off states. Moreover, it is not quite clear, in the
context of Indian state finances, whether it is really easier to improve
upon low values than higher values of the performance indicator. Much
of the revenue deficits consist of interest payments in the case of almost
all states, and large deficits tend to cause increased borrowing resulting
in higher interest payments and higher future deficits. This vicious circle
is weaker for states with low deficits and relatively easy to break out of,
as compared to high-deficit states. It is therefore not the ‘technical’ flaws,
but the conceptual problems that we think are the clinching arguments.
First, this type of incentive for achieving a revenue balance
cannot distinguish between different ways of achieving the improvement
in fiscal discipline. Reduction in expenditures and increasing revenues
are both possible routes to improve the balance. And this can be done
through raising distortionary taxes and/or reducing ‘good’ expenditures.
The effect of this criterion on the efficiency of the use of public resources
is really unpredictable. Second, it fails to distinguish between spendthrift24
governments and those having deteriorating revenue balance due to
factors beyond their control, e.g., natural calamities, economic downturn
originating from macroeconomic factors, law and order problems or
social unrest. Third, there is a political economy angle that may be
considered a weakness of this criterion. In the federal setup of India,
such a requirement may impinge on the fiscal autonomy of the states,
and is not justifiable unless there are clear spillovers of their fiscal
policies. Even when there are negative spillovers, unless the grantor
government itself exhibits fiscal prudence, the case for linking fiscal
discipline with distribution of constitutionally ordained transfers may not
be convincing.
But probably the greatest flaw of this criterion is that it is unlikely
to have a substantial incentive effect at all. Taking into account the entire
political and federal fiscal framework, there is no great incentive for a
short-term elected government to behave in a fiscally prudent manner. A
government faces the trade-off between raising more debt (and
speculating on federal gap filling) and being fiscally disciplined to receive
the “reward” of higher FC tax devolution. The future increases of FC tax
devolutions due to fiscal prudence will however probably be much
smaller than the volume attainable through debt. A state government
facing strong political pressure on a daily basis is therefore more likely to
continue on the easy path of high deficits than to “fight” for rather
uncertain future FC “rewards”. As long as the centre cannot establish
and keep up any efficient hard budget constraints, the fiscal discipline
criterion will not prevent imprudent fiscal stances and increasing debt
burden.25
V.4 Collection/Assessment Criterion: Returning Tax
 Revenues to Originating Jurisdictions
This criterion was in use from the very first FC to the Ninth, after
which it was discontinued by the Tenth, and has so far not reappeared.
The weight attached to it varied between 10 and 20 per cent. While its
removal has made the overall formula more equitable, it has predictably
been criticised by the relatively developed states. In theory, the origin
criterion is appropriate for the distribution of the proceeds of a tax when it
is presumed to be ideally in the domain of the states, but for some
reason (usually administrative, but in the interest of uniformity too) is
levied and collected by the centre. The idea in such a case is to
approximate the revenues that a state would have collected, had it
administered the tax itself.
Going by this logic, use of this criterion can possibly be justified
for the additional excise duties (on sugar, textiles and tobacco, the power
to levy sales tax on which was surrendered by the states to the centre
through a tax rental agreement) and the taxes that the states could have
collected if the centre did not abolish them (e.g. tax on railway
passengers) or did not ignore them (taxes listed under art. 269 of the
Constitution). Except for the last category, net proceeds (hypothetical
after abolition) from the other taxes were actually distributed on the origin
basis until the alternative scheme of devolution was implemented. But
the use of this criterion for the distribution of income tax was not
supported by this logic, as there has never been a presumption in India
that non-agricultural income tax was also ideally included in the domain
of the states. In fact, the record of the states in taxing agricultural
income, a power that was assigned to them by the constitution is dismal.
Most states do not use this power at all, and those that do, confine its
application to plantations only, creating loopholes that can be exploited in
evading non-agricultural income tax.
At present, since the entire tax revenue of the centre is
shareable en bloc, there is possibly a case for the use of this criterion
with a very small weight, to compensate for the fact that the amounts that
used to be (with justification) distributed on the basis of origin have been
submerged in the aggregate.26
VI. Concluding Remarks
In the Indian system of statutory transfers, criteria-based
transfers apply to tax sharing only. The deficit grants are given on the
basis of post-devolution assessed deficits alone. While there may be
several observations that one can make on the process of estimating
these deficits, this is beyond the scope of this paper. Of course, it is
difficult to assess any element of a transfer system in isolation, since
these elements usually complement each other. This is particularly true
of the objectives of the transfer system, the tools used and the process
of distribution.
We have argued that if the primary concerns of our transfer
system are to eliminate vertical imbalances and  enable the states to
minimise horizontal imbalances, then it is necessary to conceptually
separate them out. Since it is possible to think of vertical imbalance as
the minimum deficit among the individual states generalised to all states,
a small amount of transfer for each state, suitably scaled up or down for
the size, perhaps with population, should be adequate. This would leave
the more difficult question of equalising fiscal capacity without building in
the ‘wrong incentives’, while maintaining certain other virtues like
simplicity, predictability and regularity. Unfortunately, experience shows
that there is a trade-off between conceptually the best system of
equalisation, that of a full-blown normative assessment and simplicity. In
such a situation, various criteria are used to implement a formula based
system as an approximation. Moreover, if tax shares were small and the
grants constituted the primary channel of centre-state transfers, then it
would be possible to dispense with a complex distribution formula. The
tax sharing would cover vertical imbalance and the grants distributed on
the basis of normative deficits, as is done now, would take care of
equalisation. But in fact shared taxes are much larger than required to
meet vertical imbalance alone, and from this fact arises the need to use
distribution formulae that include factors representing fiscal equalisation.
To maintain the basic features of the normative assessment
system, revenue capacity and expenditure needs have to be reflected in
the formula used. Not all transfer systems use the two-pronged
approach, however. While some equalise revenue capacity only (e.g.,
Canada), others only look at expenditure needs (e.g., South Africa). This27
is perhaps all right if the inter-state differences on the omitted side are
not large. In India, this is not the case, and hence all the FC formulae for
tax sharing have tried to take into account both sides in recent times.
On the revenue capacity side, only variants of the income
criterion have been used in India. Our assessment shows several
shortcomings of the actual variables used, which make it more prudent to
use them, if at all, with a much smaller weight than actually assigned in
recent times. In fact, a direct assessment of relative revenue capacity is
both possible and desirable; given that this can be accomplished at
varying levels of complexity, a suitable balance between transparency
and comprehensiveness can be struck.
On the expenditure needs side, several variables have been
used in computing statutory transfers in India. Population, the most
neutral variable representing expenditure needs, has been consistently
used, but with progressively declining weights. The peculiar requirement
of using only 1971 population may be partly responsible for the declining
weight; else, we think it deserves a much higher weight. We also think
that the population data have not been used to maximum effect, the use
of the details available could significantly improve the formula. In
particular, an index of the percentage of population requiring special
attention of the government (scheduled castes, scheduled tribes,
children below a certain age, senior citizens, the seriously disabled)
could be a very good indicator of expenditure needs. Including such a
variable in the distribution formula with a reasonable weight would
strengthen equalisation and allow the weight on population per se to be
reduced. Care has to be taken to select variables that are not outcomes
of government policy to avoid problems relating to moral hazard (this is
the reason we are critical of the poverty criterion). Geographical features
like area, and other characteristics that may cause cost disabilities (e.g.,
hilly terrain) are also assessed to be appropriate, although it is necessary
to take into account the costs associated with highly congested urban
areas too. Criteria like an infrastructure index are best avoided, primarily
due to incentive problems; instead need-based variables ought to be
used.
The FCs have superimposed fiscal performance indicators on
the other two types of indicators discussed above. These are in principle
bad criteria to be determining transfers, and can be justified only as
temporary ones called into service for fire fighting operations, in the28
context of all round deficits. Even if the latter was the case, a simplistic
variable representing revenue balance would actually only be counter-
equalising; an appropriate multiple indicator based criterion has to be
devised.
Finally, we believe that any significant transfers based on the
origin of tax revenues is not logically maintainable; however, there is a
case for a small amount to be transferred on this basis, or an
approximation thereof.29
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